OVHcloud CLI Releases Backdoored to Steal Dev Secrets
By @sharedot · · 6 pages
- Programming
- Security
- Supply Chain Attack
- Github
- Ovhcloud
Attackers hijacked a GitHub account to backdoor five OVHcloud CLI releases with an infostealer, caught within 94 minutes by a customer's pinned hash.
Five releases swapped on GitHub
On October 19, an attacker using a hijacked developer GitHub account modified versions 0.11.0 through 0.15.0 of the open-source OVHcloud CLI, replacing release assets with binaries designed to "retrieve secrets from the disk."
The attacker replaced six files on v0.15.0, including checksums.txt, so the published hashes matched the new binaries. Versions 0.10.0 and the new 0.16.0 are clean.
One customer hash caught it
The swap might have gone unnoticed if a customer's CI job had not pinned the SHA-256 of the Linux arm64 archive and begun failing.
SQ Magazine reports the customer raised it in public GitHub issue #300, and OVHcloud deleted the swapped files about half an hour later, shipping a clean v0.16.0 at 17:16 UTC.
Notably, the only control that fired sat outside the repository: the publisher's own checksum file had been swapped to match, so it could not have raised the alarm. Homebrew installs escaped because the cask pinned original hashes, and source builds and Docker images were unaffected.
Why it caught devs off guard
The surprise is the route: CI/CD pipelines with unit tests, functional tests and CVE detection were untouched, since GitHub's release immutability setting was disabled, letting a sufficiently privileged account modify existing releases without passing any checks.
OVHcloud has since enabled release immutability, but the setting protects only releases created after it is turned on.
BleepingComputer adds that the hijacked GitHub account had been compromised for more than half a year, showing a scripted history rewrite on 5 March 2026 and a hidden preinstall.js loader, and OpenSourceMalware links the operation to the GlassWorm campaign ecosystem.
What affected users must do now
Anyone who ran an affected binary on macOS (Intel or ARM), Linux x86_64 or ARM64, or Windows x86_64 should treat all secrets on the machine as compromised.
"The quality of the binary is poor but it can go all the way. If you are affected, please change all the secrets on your disk," Klaba urged, noting that updating the tool does not revoke a key already copied.
SQ Magazine advises rotating from a different machine, then installing v0.16.0 and verifying archives with gh release verify-asset. OVHcloud has promised a detailed postmortem in the coming days.